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Utopia Transformed: The Calculated Indirection
of Thomas Starkey’s Dialogue between Pole and Lupset
Robert W. Haynes
Texas A&M International University, Laredo
Thomas Starkey’s effort to employ guarded speech and to distance himself from
some of the risky views discussed in his Dialogue between Pole and Lupset (15291536?) emulated similar features of Thomas More’s Latin Utopia and, in fact,
sought to improve on More’s striking dialogue. Though doomed by the break
between Henry VIII and Rome (and that between the king and Starkey’s dialogue’s
chief speaker), this unfinished work exhibits a particularly ambitious and in some
ways quite skillfully wrought humanist project.

Sir Thomas More’s Utopia has continued to provoke detailed and

sophisticated analysis for nearly five centuries, but an early work
by another author, which was intended as a kind of commentary
on, and elaboration of, Utopia, has not been given its proper place
in the record. This work was written by Thomas Starkey, a young
Oxford humanist and close associate of Reginald Pole. Having
studied in Italy for a number of years, Starkey decided to put forth
his perspectives in a text emulating both the classical dialogue and
Utopia, but also making the composition more accessible by using
the English language.
Starkey’s Dialogue between Pole and Lupset, a work clearly
written in emulation of More’s playful text, has generally escaped
the attention of literary critics, though analysts of Tudor politics are
increasingly finding it of interest. This lack of critical commentary
has been mainly due to the inaccessibility of a reliable text before
Thomas F. Mayer’s 1989 edition and to the unfinished nature of
Starkey’s unique text.1 Most of the work done on Starkey’s Dialogue

1 Mayer’s edition was preceded by those of Kathleen Burton (1948) and J. M. Cowper
(1871). See Mayer’s comments on these unsatisfactory editions in Thomas Starkey: A Dialogue between Pole and Lupset (Camden 4th Ser., 37. London: Royal Historical Society,
1989) xvi.
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has in fact been done by readers, primarily historians or social
theorists, for whom the text provides evidence of Italian political
influence upon Tudor England, and Starkey’s own evident sympathy
with the artistic and philosophical dimensions of Utopia as Platonic
dialogue has received little consideration.2 This paper will argue
that Starkey envisioned his own dialogue as a project that would
both appropriate the anti-tyrannical Platonic literary technique of
Utopia and extend its impact by minimizing its playful elements.
Underlying this argument is the assumption that Starkey’s Dialogue
is itself engaged in an interlocution with More’s dialogue that is
sometimes adversarial. Though Starkey’s literary effort remains
frozen in draft form, it also remains a bold and original exploration
of dialogical possibilities in an ominous decade, which had already
seen brutal devastation done to two of the world’s great cities.3
The date of composition of the Dialogue has been debated,
but evidently the developments in the relationship between Henry
VIII and Rome and particularly between the King and Reginald Pole
eventually made the work impossible for Starkey to finish, since Pole,
on whose moral authority Starkey’s dialectic is grounded, became
Henry’s mortal enemy in 1536, and he must have been regarded with
suspicion at least as early as the executions of Cardinal Fisher and
Sir Thomas More in 1535. Mayer’s view that the work was nearly all
written “between 1529 and 1532” is based on speculative inferences
about Starkey’s intentions and on paleographical considerations
including the paper on which the manuscript was written. This
carefully formulated view possibly does not sufficiently consider

2 Mayer, for example, asserts, “Starkey’s plans rested mainly on Aristotle and his Italian
humanist followers” (Thomas Starkey: A Dialogue xiii). Walter M. Gordon explores the
classical dimension of Utopia in “The Platonic Dramaturgy of Thomas More’s Dialogues,”
Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 8 (1978), 193-215. In her 1965 University
of Colorado Ph.D. dissertation (“Thomas Starkey: Tudor Humanist”), Dorothy Cameron
Jones thoughtfully adumbrated some of the fundamental dimensions of the dialogue genre:
“In the dialogue there is intrinsic naturalness and liveliness which allows for variety in tone
and expression, while the semblance of reality permits the writer to advance the thought of
the work by the interplay of personality and character” (41-42). Jones, however, did not go
on to explore the implications of these qualities of Starkey’s work.
3 For the violence against Rome in 1527, see Luigi Guicciardini, The Sack of Rome,
trans. and ed. by James H. McGregor (New York: Italica, 1993). For the violence against
Tenochtitlan in 1521, see Hugh Thomas, Conquest: Montezuma, Cortes, and the Fall of
Old Mexico (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 485-530.
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the likelihood that Starkey’s intentions were mutable in the period
between the Sack of Rome in 1527 and the arrival of Pole’s attack
on Henry’s conduct in 1536, so scholars should probably note both
Mayer’s dates and those set forth earlier, as Mayer notes, by G. R.
Elton, who “thought Starkey probably wrote it between 1532 and
1534 and revised it two years later.”4
The most compelling evidence of Thomas Starkey’s
consciousness of Thomas More=s Utopia appears immediately
as the Dialogue between Pole and Lupset opens. The character
Thomas Lupset  is visiting Reginald Pole (later Cardinal Pole and
eventually Archbishop of Canterbury under Queen Mary), cousin of
Henry VIII, at Pole’s ancestral estate of Bisham. Lupset opens the
conversation with great courtesy and a certain verbose diffidence,
which vanishes as Pole invites him to speak further about what is on
his mind. Lupset responds:
I have much & many tymys marvelyd resonyng wyth my selfe,
why you mastur pole aftur so many yerys spent in quyet studys
of letturys & lernyng, & aftur such experyence of the manerys
of man, taken in dyvers partyss beyond the see, have not before
thys settylyd your selfe, . . . applyd your mynd to the handelyng
of the materys of the commyn wele here in our owne natyon to
the intent that, bothe your frendys & cuntrey myght now at the
last receyve & take some frute of your long studys wherin you
have spent your hole youth as I . . . ever toke hyt to the same
purpos & end (1).5

This passage, as a number of scholars have pointed out, clearly
echoes the opening of the “dialogue of counsel” in the Utopia.6
4 Thomas Starkey: A Dialogue between Pole and Lupset x.

.

5 This and all quotations of Starkey are from Mayer’s edition of the text. I have made
no effort to reproduce any features of Mayer’s apparatus, and I have silently provided
occasional end-punctuation where necessary. In one exchange, I have for the sake of clarity put each speaker’s words in separate paragraphs and placed speaker designations in
bold type. James M. Pictor cites a passage following the one just cited and compares its
language to that of one of Starkey’s letters to Cromwell, pointing out that they share “The
same humanistic ideal of knowledge’s being perfect only when put to use for the good of
the common weal,” Thomas Starkey’s An Exhortation to the People, Instructing Them to
Unity and Obedience: A Critical Edition (New York: Garland, 1988), 62, n.7.
6 See Mayer, Thomas Starkey and the Commonweal: Humanist Politics and Religion
in the Reign of Henry VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), 36. In an earlier article,
Stanford E. Lehmberg’s discussion of Starkey’s debt to Utopia is particularly helpful,
“English Humanists, the Reformation, and the Problem of Counsel,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 52 (1961), 74-91. Regarding the “dialogue of counsel,” Romuald Ian
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There, Peter Giles, impressed by Hythloday’s knowledge of other
nations, remarks,
Why, my dear Raphael, I wonder that you do not attach yourself
to some king. I am sure there is none of them to whom you
would not be very welcome because you are capable not only
of entertaining a king with this learning and experience of men
and places but also of furnishing him with examples and of
assisting him with counsel. Thus, you would not only serve
your own interests excellently but be of great assistance in the
advancement of all your relatives and friends (55).

Although Giles suggests that Hythloday join the court of a
king, while Lupset wants Pole to get involved with “the materys
of the commyn wele” in England, both More’s and Starkey’s
dialogues focus early upon the question of whether the educated
man should apply himself to private studies or to political activity.
If More’s Latin Utopia embodies More’s commitment to the latter,
Starkey--who after all had before his eyes the example of More’s
rise to power—goes beyond More’s example with his own political
dialogue by composing the work in English and thus extending
the audience of the work to a wider range of those who would be
directly affected by reforms in England. Given the contemporary
official resistance to putting Scripture into English (William Tyndale
was in exile for his heretical activities, including his unauthorized
translations), and, given the surprisingly radical nature of some of
Starkey’s characters’ views, it looks as though Starkey was willing
to throw himself into the thick of politics without much regard
for his own safety. In any case, Starkey’s dialogical effort to outMore More never achieved sufficient contemporary attention to
have any effect, for by the time Starkey seems to have been ready
Lakowski observes, “More’s first readers, as the prefatory letters, especially Budé’s, recognised, could see in the debate between Hythloday and Persona More the fundamental
crisis of contemporary humanism as to whether the new humanist learning could be used
effectively to reform society,” Sir Thomas More and the Art of Dialogue, Dissertation, University of British Columbia 1993 (online edition at Early Modern Literary Studies http://
extra.shu.ac.uk/emls/iemls/work/chapters/lakowski.html), chapter 3, paragraph 58. For
further commentary, see Lakowski’s excellent Utopia bibliography at the same location.
For a more general bibliography on English Renaissance dialogue, see Oliver Schoell’s
dissertation Die Prosadialoge der Englischen Renaissance (1528-1545): Erscheinungsformen und Strukturen online at Deutsche Nationalbibliothek archive http://deposit.ddb.de/
cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=971680957 .
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to finish the work political developments in England had made its
message unacceptable. More’s negative view of Henry’s proposed
marital adjustments, along with his advocacy of Papal power, was
already making the classical humanism, which had earlier seemed
so promising, appear irrelevant to English political reality. Pole’s
eventual announcement of his rejection of Henry’s policy was his
1536 book Pro Ecclesiasticae Unitatis Defensione, in which Pole
expressed shock at the royal violence expressed in the executions of
Sir Thomas More and Cardinal John Fisher.7
In view of Henry’s willingness to destroy these distinguished
men, one must conclude that Pole would have become a bitter enemy
of the king upon the arrival of this book. This development would
have been a good reason for Starkey not to promote a personal
literary production in which a character named Reginald Pole
develops a sometimes severe critique of the contemporary régime.
In fact, Starkey’s Dialogue must have become a liability for its
author at least by 1536, especially when one considers the anxiety
felt by Sir Thomas Elyot regarding the possibility of being suspected
of possessing any of John Fisher’s works.8 No doubt Starkey’s
1536 An Exhortation to the People Instructing Them to Unity and
Obedience was composed in hope of demonstrating that despite
Starkey’s unpublished dialogue, his long association with Reginald
Pole and the Italian humanists, his loyalty to the king was beyond
question; the style of the document itself betrays its author’s stunned
recognition of the fearsome nature of the Henrician monarchy.
Starkey’s own dialogue of counsel departed from that of More
in some noteworthy respects. Neither of Starkey’s interlocutors
is named Hythloday (“Nonsense”); both of them are based upon
significant and well-connected historical figures known quite well
7 Translated as Pole’s Defense of the Unity of the Church by Joseph G. Dwyer (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1965).
8 See Elyot’s letter to Cromwell in The Letters of Sir Thomas Elyot, ed. K.J. Wilson,
Studies in Philology. Texts and Studies 73.5 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1976), 26-27.
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by Starkey himself.9 Lupset, a friend of More and Erasmus (and
editor of the second edition of the Utopia), had spent a part of his
youth in John Colet’s house.10 Pole, who, according to Joseph G.
Dwyer, “held a legitimate claim to the throne of England almost
stronger than Henry’s” (vii), was of the house of York and a man
of great distinction in his world. More’s friend William Latimer
had been Pole’s Oxford tutor. Thus this dialogue is represented as
occurring between two luminaries of Tudor humanism, one of them
a close kinsman of Henry VIII, and Starkey’s pattern accords in this
respect with that of More’s Utopia, which had included Cuthbert
Tunstall, More himself, and Peter Giles, the Dutch humanist.
Another departure from More’s dialogue of counsel occurs
in the outcome of the opening exchange between Pole and Lupset.
After Lupset has stated his concern about Pole’s failure to enter
public life, he continues in a reproachful manner to elaborate this
concern, alluding thrice to “plesure” as though Pole’s life of private
study were somehow hedonistic, and then concluding:
You see your cuntrey as me semyth requyre your helpe, & as
hyt were cry & cal unto you besyly for the same, & you as
9 The manuscript indicates that Starkey made a late substitution for one of his interlocutors. Mayer describes the alterations in the text which indicate the change of mind about
“Lupset,” who had previously been “Le” (Dialogue xi and Thomas Starkey 94). He identifies Starkey’s original “Le” with Geoffrey Lee and, finding it unlikely that the change
would have been made after Lupset’s death in late 1530, sees the change as possible evidence that much of the dialogue was written before that time. However, Starkey’s decision
to place Lupset posthumously in the dialogue would have made perfect sense as a tribute
to a gifted friend who had died early, or it may have been that Lee himself saw the dialogue
and wanted out of it. It is also worth noting that both More and Erasmus had publicly
argued with Edward Lee, who became Archbishop of York in 1531 and that More himself
had dedicated his translation of Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola’s life of Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola to Joyce Lee, quite possibly the sister of Edward and Geoffrey (see The
Complete Works of St. Thomas More, v. I, xl). Pole may have been offered the archbishopric of York in 1530, according to Thomas F. Mayer’s Reginald Pole: Prince and Prophet
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 55.
10 In his John Colet (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989),
John Gleason follows John Archer Gee’s suggestion that a character in one of Erasmus’
colloquies was based on Lupset (166). Gee presents this idea in his The Life and Works
of Thomas Lupset (New Haven: Yale UP, 1928), 35-41). If Gleason and Gee are correct,
here is another possible reason Starkey may have put Lupset in his dialogue, since by doing
so he would have been following Erasmus’ lead and perhaps strengthening or refreshing
his connections to the humanist network. Lupset himself wrote at least one dialogue (“A
Treatise of Charitie,” Gee 206-231), and Pole later wrote dialogues as well (see Mayer,
Reginald Pole 88).
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drownyd in the plesure of letturys, & pryvate studys gyve no
yere therto, but forgettyng hyr utturly suffur her styl to want
your helpe & succur, apon your behalfe not wythout gret injury
wherfor mastur pole now at the last wake out of thys dreme,
remembyr your cuntrey, loke to your frendys, consydur your
offyce & duty that you are most bounden unto (2).

Lupset’s aggrieved tone and his description of the condition
of England makes this passage notably different from the much more
casual scene in which Hythloday is advised to lend his knowledge
to kings. Pole, however, responds with a rather grave playfulness,
raising objections simply in order to see how well Lupset can
counter them. While approving of Lupset’s intention, Pole at first
pleads inexperience in ruling even himself, and then he brings up
the traditional conflict between the active life and the contemplative
life. Stating the basis for the latter, he concludes:
knolege of god of nature & of al the workys therof, schold be
the end of mannys lyfe, & the chefe poynt therin of al men to be
lokyd unto, wherfor the old & antique phylosopharys forsoke
the medelyng wyth materys of commyn welys & applyd
themselfys to the secrety studys & serchyng of nature as to the
chefe thyng wherin semyd to rest the perfectyon of man, & thus
to them hyt apperyd that prudence & pollycy were not to be
comparyd wyth hye phylosophye (3).

Lupset annihilates this argument with citations of Aristotle. The two
ways of life are essentially connected, he argues. Showing no respect
for Pole’s anonymous “idul and slomering” (24) old philosophers,
Lupset neatly wraps up his refutation:
al be hyt that that hye phylosophy & contemplatyon of nature
be of hyt selfe a grettur perfectyon of mannys mynd, as hyt
wych ys the end of the actyve lyfe, to the wych al mennys dedys
schold ever be referryd, yet the medelyng wyth the causys of
the commyn wel ys more necessary & ever rather & fyrst to be
chosen, as the pryncypal mean wherby we may attayne to the
other, for hyther tendyth al prudence & pollycy, to bryng the
hole cuntrey to quyetnes & cyvylyte, that every man & so the
hole may at the last attayn to such perfectyon as by nature ys to
the dygnyte of man dew (5).
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In other words, social order makes philosophy possible, so the true
lover of wisdom must devote himself to politics. Implicit here is
that anyone enjoying philosophy while avoiding politics is a drone.
An underlying implication may well be that the effect of More’s
Utopia, which Jean-François Vallée writes “was artfully meant to
destabilize, provoke and transform the friendly reader,” has been
wasted.11
Pole tries another dodge, but Lupset, his patience diminishing,
makes short work of his objection, exhorting Pole “wythout any mo
cavyllatyonys” (7) to get involved in public life. Pole responds by
bringing up the problems posed by cultural relativism. How may
men know what is right in society when different societies have
different customs? Lupset’s response is that these different customs
result from differences in civil laws made by each state to suit its
own circumstances. The natural law within each state, however, is
the same everywhere. The civil laws are intended to enable man
to live in accord with his nature, and insofar as they do so they are
correct, however they might differ between nations. Here is the first
major surprise of the dialogue. Though the Christian world has been
subjected to increasing internal tensions from the time of Martin
Luther=s emergence through that of the Sack of Rome in 1527,
Lupset makes his response an argument for tolerance. He argues
that such customs as the Christian abstention from meat on Friday,
priestly chastity, and monogamy are matters of civil law, strongly
suggesting that in states where such practices are not followed the
customs might still be in accord with the law of nature. He maintains
of Jews, Saracens, Turks, and Moors that
so long as they lyve aftur the law of nature, observyng also
theyr cyvyle ordynance as mean to bryng them to the end of the
same, they schal not be damnyd” (35).

This is a long, eloquent, and effective speech by Lupset,
and Reginald Pole finds it persuasive. Here we come to the second
departure from More’s dialogue of counsel. While Morus and
11 Jean-François Vallée, “The Fellowship of the Book: Printed Voices and Written Friendships in More’s Utopia,” in Printed Voices: The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue, ed. Dorothea Heitsch and Jean-François VallJe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 56.
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Hythloday remain in disagreement about participating in public
life, here Pole and Lupset come to an accord on the subject. Pole
confesses that he has agreed all along but has wanted to hear Lupset
argue the case. He sums up:
maystur lup I am content let us agre apon thys, let us take thys
as a ground, that every man ought to apply hymselfe to the
settyng forward of the commyn wele, every man ought to study
to helpe hys cuntrey (15).

While this mutual resolution contrasts to the dramatic situation
that occurs in Utopia, it must be noted that the agreement reached
by Starkey’s characters is precisely the conclusion reached by More
years earlier and announced indirectly by him in his Latin dialogue.
In the passage which follows, Starkey pays More the tribute of
imitation--an imitation the more significant because Utopia had not
been translated into English. Starkey, at least in the earlier stages of
composing his work, would have expected More and More’s friends
to see the Pole-Lupset dialogue upon its completion. Here Pole,
having voiced an agreement in principle with Lupset, points out that
politics has its practical hazards:
yet ther ys a nother thyng to be consyduryd, wych hath causyd
many grete wyse & polytyke men to abhorre from commyn
welys, & thys ys the regard of tyme & place, for though hyt be
so that a man to meddyl wyth materys perteynyng to the wele of
hys hole cuntrey ys of al thyng best & most to be desyryd, yet in
some tyme and certayn place hyt ys not to be temptyd of wyse
men, wych ryght wel perceyve theyr labur to be spent in vayn,
as in tyme of tyranny or in such place where they that rule are
bent only to theyr pryvate wele, what thynke you among such
the conseyl of a wyse man schold avayle, wythout dowte hyt
schold be laughyd at, & no thyng at al hyt schold be regardyd,
no more then a tale tollyd among deffe men, wherfor hyt semyth
not wythout cause they ever absteynyd in such tyme & place
from medelyng wyth materys of the commyn wele (15).

This entire passage resounds with echoes from the
corresponding section of Utopia. In More’s work, Hythloday, having
cited some hypothetical examples of honest advice he might give a
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king, concludes: “To sum it all up, if I tried to obtrude these and the
like ideas on men strongly inclined to the opposite way of thinking,
to what deaf ears should I tell the tale!” (97). Like Hythloday, Pole
refers to Plato’s failed experiment in Sicily, and, like Hythloday, he
cites the classical comparison of the philosopher to a man taking
shelter from a storm.12
Lupset responds to Pole’s caution by conceding that some
prudence is desirable, but he goes on:
how be hyt I thynke agayne also, that ther ys nother so much
respect of tyme nother of place to be had as many men juge,
wych thynke the hyest poynt of wysdome to stond therin & so
naroly & so curyously they pondur the tyme & the place, that in
al theyr lyfys they nother fynd tyme nor place, they loke I trow
for platos commyn wele, in such expectatyon they spend theyr
lyfe, as they thynke wyth grete polytyke wysdome, but in dede
wyth grete frantyke foly, for of thys I am sure that suche exacte
consyderyng of tyme hath causyd many commyn welys utturly
to perysch, hyt hath causyd in many placys much tyranny, wych
myght have byn amendyd yf wyse men in tyme & in place wold
have bent themselfe to that purpos, levyng such fon respecte of
tyme & of place. (16)

Here Lupset voices a motive that should be remembered
during any consideration of this dialogue as a whole. Later in
the text, Pole and Lupset express opinions that must have been
dangerous, given Henry’s usual treatment of dissent, and it seems
almost incredible that Starkey would have expressed such opinions.
Whether or not he actually submitted his full text for anyone else’s
perusal--and this question remains a mystery, the only conceivable
impulse for his putting so much labor into composing this dialogue
is that stated here by Lupset. Wise men have a duty to amend tyran
ny, even at their own risk. This passage appears to be a response to
More’s analogy of politics to drama, in which tragic speeches are
out of place in comedy. Lupset’s point is that it is better to risk being
ludicrous than to wait too long. The allusion to folly might even
12 Utopia, 16-23. More attributes this metaphor to Plato. Starkey changes the comparison
somewhat and attributes it to Plutarch. See the note in Utopia, ed. Edward Surtz and J. H.
Hexter, v. 4 of The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More (New Haven
and London: Yale UP, 1965), 377.
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suggest Lupset’s friend Erasmus’ long search for the right place to
apply his learning. Thomas More, despite Hythloday’s perspective,
had long been in political life by this time, and though Starkey
has taken More’s dialogue as his paradigm, he has no more been
uncritical in so doing than was More in his use of Plato.
Like Utopia, Starkey’s Dialogue responds to its literary
antecedents, assenting, negating, and making counter-assertions.
Starkey, however, employs the defensive or precautionary distancing
effect of dialogue with less caution than did More. Here the
guardedness of the language seems entirely insufficient to obviate
blame for the nature of the views set forth. While Starkey, like the
arch-dialogist Plato and unlike More, never appears in the work at
all, his use of English as his medium and his explicit consideration of
the English status quo, along with the specific proposals for reform
in England, notably diminish the distancing which makes the Utopia
such a playful enigma.
Starkey’s motive in choosing Reginald Pole as principal
explicator of the proposed reforms is also a most interesting question.
While Pole may have been and probably was the highest-ranking
of Starkey’s personal friends, the implications of such a noble
character’s trenchant critique of the English regime would have
been unfathomable. Although both More and Plato included friends
in their dialogues, and Starkey thus had the authority of precedent
in doing so himself, it seems almost impossible not to conclude that
including Pole as radical dissident would have been quite perilous at
least for Starkey and in all likelihood for Pole as well—assuming that
Starkey would not have attributed such views to the latter without
some justification—unless Starkey believed himself to be somehow
safe from the wrath of the king. Such security—and this of course is
speculative—might have arisen (if only in Starkey’s mind) because of
Henry’s affection for Pole or even from Starkey’s hope for patronage
from his fellow dialogist who was Lord Chancellor. Aside from
such speculations, we can only wonder at Starkey’s temerity and, in
view of the political views proposed in his dialogue, at the apparent
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impunity with which he developed his ideas. Clearly, the calculated
indirection of Starkey’s dialogue was rendered less innocuous as
the royal authority responded to what it perceived as threats from
those whose affinities to Rome remained powerful, and thus this
work, whose public appearance seems to have been precluded by
the king’s break with Rome, provides a unique basis for exploration
of the interaction of humanism and political force.
Starkey’s dialogical technique in this work is fairly
sophisticated. While Walter M. Gordon has explicated the
Platonic literary techniques which shaped More’s Utopia, most
of the explication of this work has been done by analysts who
are considerably less interested in its careful artistry. Thomas F.
Mayer and Åke Bergvall, for example, assume that Pole is a fairly
uncomplicated mouthpiece for Starkey’s own programs.13 This
dialogue, however, does represent an effort to reproduce the giveand-take of an actual conversation between two men of learning and
substance. As explained earlier, Pole tricks Lupset into arguing for
a position Pole has already accepted. Later, whenever Pole makes
an assertion with which Lupset disagrees, Lupset objects with
such frequency that Pole becomes impatient with him. After Pole
has attacked the abuses of legal guardianship, Lupset defends the
concept, citing in his argument the fact that such guardianship was
established in England by William the Conqueror. Pole’s response
is a bit sharp:

13 Although Mayer begins to critique the Dialogue by acknowledging that “. . . the same
sort of `polyphonic` structure which Arthur Blaim detects in Utopia also characterized the
Dialogue” (106), it is not long before he assumes that the positions put forth by individual
interlocutors are uncritically represented as Starkey’s own positions, as, for example, “A
major plank of Starkey’s programme called for nobles to be sent to converted monasteries
in order to ‘lerne ther the dyscyplyne of the commyn wele’”(116); and “Starkey boasted
that ‘our pepul of englond . . . [are the] most rych & welthy of any commyns aboute
us’” (117). Despite Mayer’s announced appreciation of the potential of the dialogue for
subtlety, then, these passages reflect a somewhat simplistic practical procedure. Mayer’s
reference above is to Blaim’s article “More’s Utopia: Persuasion or Polyphony?” Moreana: Bulletin Thomas More 19.73 (March 1982): 5-20. Bergvall, in “Reason in English
Renaissance Humanism: Starkey, More, and Ascham,” Connotations: A Journal for Critical Debate 3.3 (1993-1994), 213-25, takes a similar approach, though he does explain that
he does so because the dialogue’s interlocutors’ “positions are not really at variance” (225).
In a brief response to Bergvall, however, Patrick Grant, in “Of Fountains and Foundations:
An Elaboration on Åke Bergvall, Connotations 4.3 (1994-95), 228-232, demonstrates a
fine critical perception, pointing out a fundamental metaphorical pattern in Starkey’s figurative representation of fountains and foundations.
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wel mastur lup. Set what face you wyl apon thys mater, you can
not persuade me thys ordur to be gud, specyally when I loke to
the perfayt commyn wele wych I wold myght be stabylyschyd
here in our cuntrey, let hyt be so that at the tyme of the fyrst
entre of the conquerour or tyranne cal hym as you wyl thys
maner myght be for the tyme convenyent, but now yf we wyl
restore our cuntrey to a perfayt state wyth a true commyn wele
we must schake of al such tyrannycal custumys & unresonabyl
bandys, instytute by that tyranne when he subduyd our cuntrey
& natyon (77-78).

Lupset’s response is apologetic in tone, and he promises not to delay
Pole’s further explication. Pole replies:
mastur lup. Therin you dow well, for yf you schold tary our
communycatyon wyth sophystycal argymentys, we schold not
thys day note halfe the erorys wych I purpos to talke wyth you
of, for ther ys no thyng so true & manyfest, but the suttylyte
of mannys reson may devyse somethyng to say contrary & to
impugne the same, as in thys wych now I wyl speke of wych me
semyth ys so manyfest an erroure in our law that no man may
hyt deny, & yet I can not thynke but you wyl fynd some what to
lay agayne hyt (78).

Lupset, unintimidated, answers:
hyt may welbe but I promys you as I have sayd befor I wyl
not repugne for no study nor desyre of victory, but only for the
inventyon of the truth, & equyte for you know wel that dowtyng
& laying somewhat agayne the truth maketh hyt oft tymys to
appere more manyfest & playn, therfor let us see what thyng
hyt ys that you thynke so manifest afaute.

Not only does the dialogue here exhibit some dramatic
vitality, but it also reveals a playful self-consciousness. Discussing
serious matters, the two characters incidentally remind us that
they are human—as of course they are not—and Lupset’s remarks
remind us not only that we are reading a dialogue but also that one
dimension of dialogue is to extend the reader’s perspective in a
particular way. Lupset here playfully retaliates against Pole, who
had, as the conversation began, pretended to have doubts about his
own suitability to engage in the political life, telling Lupset at one
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point “you cal them Cavyllatyons, wych I cal resoning & dowtyng
for the cleryng of the truth” (7). Such moments as this in the text
inform us of Starkey’s consciousness of the aesthetic potential of
the dialogue form. Later, another animated exchange breaks up the
incipient monotony of Pole’s itemizing of English problems. Pole
has finished critiquing errors in English law, and here he turns to
English social customs. The exchange follows:
po. fyrst & most pryncypal of al yl custumys usyd in our
cuntre commynly aftur my jugement ys that wych touchyth the
educatyon of the nobylyte, whome we see custumably brought
up in huntyng & haukyng dysyng & cardyng etyng & drynkyng
& in conclusion in al vayn plesure pastyme & vanyte & that
only ys thought to perteyne to a gentylman even as hys propur
fayt offyce & duty as though they were borne therto & to no
thyng els in thys world of nature brought forth.
Lup. Wy syr I pray what wold you have them to dow, go to plow
& to carte or to lerne some other craft to get theyr lyvyng by, as
a thyng requyred of necessyte?
po. mastur lup. What I wold have them to dow now the place
ys not here to schow, & declare, wych hereaftur I wyl not omyt
but that thys they dow hyt is certayn & to al men by experyence
knowen, wych aftur myn opynyon ys no smal destructyon of
our commyn wele that we now seke & desyre to see stablyschyd
here in our cuntre, for of thys poynt hangyth a grete parte of the
veray welth of the hole commynalty.
Lup. Surely thys thyng ys amys, wherfor procede you ferther, I
wyl not repugne agayn so manyfest a truthe (86).

Lupset quickly recognizes that his objection was illconsidered, but the alacrity of his retreat in the face of Pole’s implied
rebuke is amusing, and his last statement does not look entirely
serious, which points out by contrast the relative humorlessness of
Pole. It must be remembered, of course, that Starkey’s dialogue is
an unfinished work, and that the character called Lupset, as Thomas
Mayer has explained, was originally a “Mr. Le.” So any evaluation
of the development of this character in the dialogue must be open
to possible objection on the ground that Starkey may have had at
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different times different personality traits in mind for this character,
at least if he was intending for any perceptible relationship to exist
between the character and its historical counterpart. Yet it does
seem that the Lupset of the dialogue loves a good argument, whereas
Pole is sometimes impatient with objections. And certainly Starkey
demonstrates his own skill at creating character and in maintaining
extended dialogue without reducing the secondary character to an
affirmative abstraction. For example, when Lupset suddenly concurs
with a sequence of Pole’s assertions about abuses in the church, Pole
reacts with suspicion:
mastur lup. you are in thys materys veray esy to persuade you
make no objectyonys aftur your maner in other thyngys wherfor
I somewhat feare that we admyt over quykly thes fautys in the
church for some pryvate hate that we bere agayne the prestys &
prelatys therin (88).

Lupset reassures Pole, but in this passage again we see the skill of a
dialogist who is concerned with verisimilitude. Instead of leaving
Lupset’s sequence of agreements to stand without comment, Starkey
has Pole notice it, as a reader would, and question Lupset’s motive.
Thus the dramaturgy of Starkey’s Dialogue shows the same
kind of sophistication and play that characterizes both More’s Utopia
and Plato’s dialogues. Starkey’s characters discuss Plato, with Pole
emphasizing the basic agreement between Plato and Aristotle, but
Starkey’s evident intention in this work is to “English” the dialogue
in a new way, borrowing as convenient from Plato—especially in
creating a work of art as his vehicle of thought—and extending
some dimensions of the political teaching of More’s Utopia to apply
unequivocally to contemporary England. Despite the danger that
was involved in this latter task, Starkey believed himself morally
obligated to promulgate humanist politics and a program of Church
reform. With Thomas More having led the way into the active life,
Starkey must have, given More’s rise to political prominence, viewed
the indirectness of the presentation of political reality in Utopia as
excessively cautious, and his departures from More’s procedure
show a desire to bring more matter and less art to the world of actual
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politics. At the end of the first day’s talk, having persuaded Pole to
describe the “veray & true Commyn wele,” Lupset exhorts him,
but here of one thyng I pray you take hede that in thys your
devyse of your communycatyon thys commyn wele & you
folow not the exampul of plato, of whose ordur of commyn
wele no pepul apon erth to thys days coud ever yet attayn (18).

As J. W. Allen pointed out in 1928, this passage is “doubtless with
reference to Plato and More.”14 Lupset goes on:
therfor loke you to the nature of our cuntrey to the maner of our
pepul, not wythout respect both of tyme & of place, that your
devyse heraftur by the helpe of our most nobul prynce may the
soner optayne his fruit & effect.

Starkey was fully aware that in the fourteen or so years since Utopia
had been first published More’s political insights as set forth in that
book had produced no such “fruit & effect” as hoped for, and he
wished consequently to make his own views on English government
much more explicit than those suggested in Utopia.
Like More, however, Starkey strongly advocated basing
government upon reason and upon nature, and, as a logical result
of such a political conviction, he makes Reginald Pole—himself of
royal blood—voice vehement opposition to tyranny. Thus although
Starkey was affected to some extent by contemporary political
theory,15 the essence of his theory of government is classical. And
of the classical political philosophers, the most vigorous (and
experienced) opponent of tyranny was Plato, whose chosen mode of
literary expression More had found a suitable medium for his own
critique of the English status quo.
Employing this same medium, Starkey has Pole develop a
radically anti-autocratic view that not only condemns tyranny but
even rejects hereditary monarchy itself. Such a view is particularly
14 J. W. Allen A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London: Methuen,
1928), 144.
15 See Mayer Thomas Starkey, passim, and the assessment of the Dialogue by Alistair
Fox in Reassessing the Henrician Age: Humanism, Politics and Reform 1500-1550, ed.
Fox and Guy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 47-50.

Quidditas 30 (2009) 94

interesting when one considers King Henry’s strenuous efforts to
ensure his own succession. But Pole’s opposition to the inheritance
of kingship is only one of a number of extreme measures he proposes
to Lupset in the dialogue. He also advocates strict limitation of
the king’s power by means of a ruling council, the replacement
of the English common law with Roman law, the revival of the
defunct position of Constable of England, and a number of other
improvements that almost seem calculated to render Henry VIII
apoplectic. Pole also recommends conciliar appropriation of papal
power and cancellation of the requirement of chastity for secular
priests. Although these proposals are authorially attributed to
Henry’s noble cousin Pole, Henry, if he had read this work himself,
would have known who had set them to paper, and there is no doubt
that he would have found them an affront to his sovereignty. In
fact, Pole explicitly attacks the concept of the king’s privileged
relationship to God. He tells Lupset:
And now to our purpos even as every partycular man when he
folowyth reson ys governyd by god & contrary blyndyd wyth
ignorance by hys owne vayn opynyon, so hole natyonys, when
they lyve togyddur in cyvyle ordur instytute & governyd by
resonabul pollycy are then governyd by the provydence of god &
be under hys tuytyon, as contrary, when they wythout gud ordur
& polytyke rule they are rulyd by the violence of tyranny, they
are not governyd by hys provydence nor celestyal ordynance,
but as a man governyd by affectys, so they be tormentyd
infynyte ways, by the reson of such tyrannycal powar, so that of
thys you may se that hyt ys not god that provydyth tyrannys to
rule in cytes & townes nomore then hyt ys he that ordeynyth yl
afectys to over run ryght reson (110-111).

Italics here are editorial. By this time, Pole has firmly established
that England is a country “wythout gud ordur & polytyke rule,” and,
consequently, despite an occasional passage of rather faint praise
of Henry VIII, Pole’s conclusion is that England is “rulyd by the
violence of tyranny.” He continues:
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hyt ys not man that can make a wyse prynce of hym that lakkyth
wyt by nature, nor make hym just that ys a tyranne for plesure,
but thys ys in mannys powar to electe & chose hym that ys both
wyse & just & make hym a prynce, & hym that ys a tyranne so
to depose.

This comment may remind the reader of Pole’s earlier criticism of
royal succession, a point of view about which Lupset warned: “syr,
take you hede here what you say, for thys poynt that you now touch
wyl seme peraventure to many, to sowne to some treason” (68).
Starkey, then, was conscious of how the ideas of his principal
speaker might be interpreted as a threat to the theoretical basis of Tudor
rule. Despite his dramaturgic self-exclusion from the dialogue, he
yet remained in danger of accusation of treason, especially as Henry
moved away from Rome and toward consolidation of his own control
of the English church. The executions of the Carthusians, of Fisher,
and of More, along with Pole’s subsequent literary attack on Henry,
made the theories set forth in the Dialogue ever more dangerous to
Starkey. The radical and specific nature of those theories abrogated
any guardedness of speech that the dialogical formulation of the
work might otherwise have made possible. Where More’s dialogical
distancing in Utopia artfully effected the playful presentation of
serious political theory, Starkey seems to have made such demands
on this distancing that the ultimate effect of his dialogue is to convey
a sense not only of his theoretical perspicacity but also of his almost
incredible lack of prudence.
While Starkey certainly learned a great deal from More’s
Utopia, he also, in rejecting the rules of the game of Henrician
practical politics, failed to learn that how one communicates in the
active life can be as crucial as what one intends to communicate.
Although he emulated More in writing political dialogue, Starkey
rejected the Platonic subtlety of Utopia, thus ultimately succeeding
only in creating peril for himself—and for Pole—in a world
increasingly under the control of a suspicious and brutal autocrat.
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